TTTPS: Byzantine Audit API

Proof-of-Time · Byzantine Fault Detection · IETF Draft · Commercial Audit Tool

One cryptographic proof chain, regulator-ready audit across jurisdictions: tamper-rejecting at ingress, tamper-evident after write, operator-independent.

EU AI Act GPAI/Art.53 · Aug 2, 2026 (confirmed) · high-risk (Art.12) deferred to Dec 2027 (Digital Omnibus, provisional)

MiFIR Art.22c EU AI Act Art.12/53 DORA Art.17 MAS TRM Korea AI Basic Act CoE AI Treaty: In Force
2,056
req/s HTTP E2E (GCP 2vCPU · k6 500VU)
~16K
req/s est. (Equinix 100GbE · 16-core · linear scale)
143B
wire format (IETF draft-helmprotocol-tttps-03)
7+6
Byzantine attack vectors: 7 detected live, 6 roadmap (13 total)
Multi
jurisdiction, one chain

The Problem

Distributed systems (inference clusters, CDN networks, payment processors, telco signaling) lean on timestamps to sequence events, block replays, and satisfy regulators. But one clock is one point of trust. Compromise the NTP server, spoof the GPS signal, inject a false clock update, and the entire audit trail is corrupt. Traditional systems catch it after the fact, or never.

TTTPS closes this at the protocol level. Every attestation anchors to multiple independent time sources at once: NIST Roughtime and network time; GPS and Equinix PTP (±1µs, SVC target); GEO/KTSat ±10ns (roadmap), bound into a cryptographic commitment chain. Manipulate one source and the others disagree, detected instantly. Replay the same token and the chain registers a verifiable collision.

Overview

Most systems trust a single clock. Wrong by drift, or compromised by NTP injection or GPS spoofing: the whole audit trail goes with it, and nothing inside the system can tell.

TTTPS anchors every token to multiple independent sources at once: NIST Roughtime and network time; GPS and Equinix PTP (±1µs, SVC target); GEO/KTSat ±10ns (roadmap), across one commitment chain. Manipulate one and the rest disagree. The divergence is logged with the exact attack type, so the trail survives even under active attack.

Replay is just as visible: submit a token twice and the chain collides on the second verify. No trust in the submitter, no trust in the network: only that the commitment is internally consistent.

Why tampering doesn't work

Three independent layers close every angle of attack, from the moment a token arrives to the moment a regulator reads the log.

1. Tamper-rejecting at ingress Replayed, stale, or cross-context inputs are refused at the protocol boundary, before any record is written. Wrong context, past its window, or submitted twice: discarded outright. It never enters the chain.
2. Hash-linked + Ed25519-signed Each event commits to the previous chain digest. Edit anything after write, however small, and the hash breaks, visible to any verifier. The Ed25519 signature over the final digest cannot be recomputed without the private key.
3. Independently verifiable Verification needs only the published public key. The operator holds no privileged position and cannot silently rewrite history. Submitter, counterparty, and regulator all read the same evidence. None has to trust the others.

Result: operator-independent, regulator-ready evidence. The chain speaks for itself.

Attack Detection Capability Matrix

7 attack vectors actively detected (6 on roadmap) via cryptographic commitment chain and temporal verification.

Attack Type Detection Mechanism Layer Log Field
Token Replay Commitment chain collision: same token submitted twice yields mismatch on second verify Application attack_type: "REPLAY"
Timestamp Drift Multi-source time anchor cross-check; delta exceeds ±10 ms threshold Protocol attack_type: "DRIFT"
Signature Forgery Ed25519 signature verification against published pubkey fails Cryptographic attack_type: "FORGE"
Flood DDoS Rate-limit token bucket per ctx_id; excess requests flagged Transport attack_type: "FLOOD"
Ordering Attack Chain digest sequence check; out-of-order submission breaks chain integrity Protocol attack_type: "ORDERING"
Cross-Pool Replay ctx_id binding in commitment; token from pool A rejected by pool B Application attack_type: "CROSS_POOL"
Sybil Identity multiplicity detected via convergent commitment patterns across ctx_ids Application attack_type: "SYBIL"
GPS Spoofing Time anchor from GPS cross-referenced with network time; divergence triggers alert Physical attack_type: "GPS_SPOOF"
NTP Injection Multiple independent time sources compared; single-source manipulation isolated Network attack_type: "NTP_INJECT"
BGP Hijacking Route-origin commitment verified against signed prefix advertisement Network attack_type: "BGP_HIJACK"
DNS Poisoning Resolution binding in token; mismatched endpoint detected at verify step Network attack_type: "DNS_POISON"
SDN Flow Manipulation Path-fingerprint delta comparison; altered flow topology breaks commitment Network attack_type: "SDN_MANIP"
Protocol Violation Schema validation on all fields; malformed token structure rejected at ingress Application attack_type: "PROTO_VIOLATION"

Lattice Commitment Pipeline

Multi-stage cryptographic commitment architecture. Each stage narrows the attack surface.

Multi-source time anchors → lattice-based integrity pipelineHMAC-SHA256Ed25519 signature

Cryptographic primitives: Ed25519 signing · blake3 keyed hash · 143-byte wire format (IETF draft-helmprotocol-tttps-03)
All manipulation at any stage converges to commitment mismatch at verify.

The pipeline ingests independent time sources: NIST Roughtime, network time; GPS and Equinix PTP (±1µs, SVC target); GEO/KTSat ±10ns (roadmap), and computes a layered commitment, sealed with an Ed25519 signature over the final chain digest. Tamper at any stage, by any vector, and verification returns a mismatch.

SealingSwitch: Turbo / Full

Adaptive sealing mode based on time-source quality.

ModeConditionLatencyUse Case
Turbo PTP sync available (±10µs) Fast path: blake3 keyed root only High-frequency inference, CDN delivery, payment rails
Full PTP unavailable / clock drift detected Full lattice pipeline Regulatory submission, cross-border compliance, audit export

Note: internal pipeline architecture proprietary. Contact info@kenosian.com for technical deep-dive under NDA.

Real-World Attack Scenarios

How TTTPS catches attacks that traditional audit systems miss entirely.

AttackWhat HappensHow TTTPS Catches ItLog Field
NTP Injection Attacker compromises NTP server, advances clock 30s to replay old transactions GPS and Roughtime anchors disagree with the manipulated NTP anchor: multi-source consensus fails attack_type: "NTP_INJECT"
Token Replay Same API request submitted twice with identical timestamp token Commitment chain registers a collision on second submission: mathematically impossible for two valid unique tokens attack_type: "REPLAY"
Signature Forgery Attacker intercepts and modifies payload, attempts to recompute signature Ed25519 verification fails against published public key: no valid signature possible without the private key attack_type: "FORGE"
GPS Spoofing Attacker broadcasts false GPS time signal to ground infrastructure Roughtime and NTP anchors disagree with GPS: cross-source delta exceeds ±10ms threshold attack_type: "GPS_SPOOF"
Ordering Attack Attacker reorders a sequence of legitimate tokens to alter apparent event history Chain digest sequence check breaks: out-of-order submission violates chain integrity attack_type: "ORDERING"

Live Demo · No API key required · Rate-limited

Calls api.kenosian.com live, shows token + Byzantine audit result
Click the button to generate a PoT token and verify it in real time.

Or via curl:

Step 1: Generate a token

curl -X POST https://api.kenosian.com/api/demo/pot/generate \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"ctx_id":"demo"}'

Expected response:

{
  "status":         "ok",
  "ctx_id":         "demo",
  "timestamp_ms":   1748000000000,
  "lattice_commitment": "a3f9c2...",
  "chain_digest":   "b7c2e1...",
  "signature":      "ed25519-base64...",
  "pubkey":         "acac8eae..."
}

Step 2: Verify (replay attack detection)

curl -X POST https://api.kenosian.com/api/demo/pot/verify \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"ctx_id":"demo","token":"<paste token from step 1>"}'

Step 3: Trigger replay detection

# Submit same token twice → REPLAY detected
curl -X POST https://api.kenosian.com/api/demo/pot/verify \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"ctx_id":"demo","token":"<same token>"}'
{"valid":false,"attack_type":"REPLAY"}

Audit Log

curl "https://api.kenosian.com/audit?ctx_id=demo&window=3600" \
  -H "X-API-Key: <your-key>"

Response (real measurement basis):

{
  "ctx_id": "demo",
  "window_secs": 3600,
  "total_requests": 142,
  "byzantine_total": 3,
  "byzantine_ratio": 0.021,
  "attack_breakdown": { "REPLAY": 2, "DRIFT": 1, "FORGE": 0, "FLOOD": 0 }
}

Prometheus metrics:

curl https://api.kenosian.com/metrics
tttps_attack_total{type="replay"}   2
tttps_attack_total{type="drift"}    1
tttps_byzantine_ratio               0.021

API Coverage · Self-serve key, no card · Live Scalar console

The self-sealing receipts service below is the live API documented at api.kenosian.com/openapi.json. Each card opens the matching endpoint directly in the Scalar console with a working request panel: same server, same schema, no separate sandbox.

Self-serve access
Mint a key
Issues a provenance API key on the spot with a free seal quota, no approval step and no card. The raw key is returned once and never stored server-side.
POST /v1/keys
Seal
Anchor a hash
Seals a client-computed sha256 digest to an operator-independent time seal. The raw payload is never transmitted or stored, only the digest.
POST /v1/anchor
Verify
Check a receipt
Re-checks a receipt's signature against its sealed timestamp and content hash. Stateless and operator-independent: anyone holding the receipt id can run it.
POST /v1/verify
Audit
List receipts
Returns seal usage and recent receipts for a key: the same dashboard data a counterparty or regulator can independently replay against the public signature.
GET /v1/receipts

When to Use TTTPS

TTTPS is the right tool when you need to prove when something happened, not just that it happened.

Use CaseWhat TTTPS Provides
LLM inference clusters Cryptographic audit trail of every KV cache transfer between prefill and decode nodes: detect replay, ordering, and forgery attacks in real time (Hydra-KV integration)
CDN / game patch delivery Per-chunk delivery proof: any content owner or regulator can verify exactly when a chunk was delivered, to which node, and that it was unmodified (Hydra-CDN integration)
Payment processors Timestamp every payment attestation with cryptographic proof resistant to clock manipulation: regulatory-grade tamper evidence
Telco / ISP signaling TRAI-aligned audit trail for all inter-node signaling: JSON-LD export format ready for submission
Any distributed API Byzantine attack detection on every request: REPLAY, FLOOD, FORGE, DRIFT detected and logged automatically

Built on TTTPS

TTTPS is not a standalone product line running in parallel to the Hydra family: it is the timing-integrity root of trust underneath it. Each product below anchors its own domain-specific proof to the same TTTPS commitment chain; none of them ship their own competing timestamp layer.

TTTPS is the root of trust; the Hydra products are what running it in production looks like.

Regulatory Alignment

TTTPS provides cryptographic proof-of-time designed to satisfy timestamp integrity requirements across financial and infrastructure regulations.

RegulationRequirementTTTPS Coverage
MiFIR Art.22c RTS
EU MiFIR Art.22c (clock-sync, RTS 25 ±1ms), pending application date
±1ms clock synchronization for HFT; ±100µs for systematic internalisers and trading venues Multi-source PoT via Equinix PTP (±1µs, SVC target) · cryptographic divergence detection · ESMA-aligned
FINRA Rule 4590
CAT NMS Plan, US
Clock synchronization audit trail Tamper-evident PoT log, queryable per-event
DORA Art.10
EU 2022/2554
ICT threat detection mechanisms 7 Byzantine attack vectors detected and logged in real time (6 roadmap)
MAS TRM 2021 + AIRG 2025
Section 6.4.1 + AI Risk Mgmt Guidelines, Singapore
Financial infrastructure time audit Multi-anchor PoT with NTP + Roughtime and Equinix PTP (±1µs, SVC target); GEO/KTSat ±10ns (roadmap)
FCA PS17/14
UK MiFID II equivalent
Clock synchronization, audit trail integrity Ed25519-signed PoT chain, designed to support forensic evidence submission
TRAI / CERT-In
India
Telecom timestamp integrity, incident reporting PoT format aligned with TRAI audit requirements; CERT-In structured evidence format
FCA MAR 7A
UK Market Abuse Regulation
Clock synchronization, audit trail integrity for trading venues Ed25519-signed PoT chain, structured for submission in FCA proceedings
FSA FIEA Art.156
Japan Financial Instruments and Exchange Act
Order management system timestamp records Per-event PoT log queryable per-order; JSON-LD export for FSA submission
SEC Rule 17a-3
US Securities and Exchange Commission
Records of orders, confirmations, and audit trail integrity Tamper-evident PoT per transaction; Prometheus alert on Byzantine detection
ACMA Telecommunications Act
Australia
Network integrity, interoperability audit requirements Byzantine-resistant PoT chain across multi-carrier peering points

Compliance & Audit Export

TTTPS generates a tamper-evident audit trail suitable for submission to regulatory bodies.

Format / OrganizationDetails
JSON-LD export Structured, machine-readable audit records compatible with standard compliance tooling
Prometheus + Grafana Live metrics dashboard: contact info@kenosian.com for access

How to Deploy

Three questions a client asks: where does it attach, where is it served, and what do I actually implement. Concretely:

1 · Where it attaches

TTTPS binds to one layer of the transaction: pre-settlement ingestion, the moment an event enters the books, before it is committed. You do not modify the asset, the chain, or the settlement value. You seal the timing and order at the gate. Attach it to a stablecoin settlement flow and that stablecoin carries a tamper-rejecting record of when and in what order every transfer cleared: an integrity layer on top of an existing token, not a new token.

2 · Where it is served

The verification engine runs off-chain, on a data-center fabric, co-located with the systems that move at payment and inference speed. It can be served on a DC fabric (e.g. Digital Realty or Equinix Fabric) or self-hosted; either is supported, neither is a precondition. An on-chain anchor is optional: commit a periodic chain digest on-chain when you want long-lived public anchoring for audit, and skip it when you do not.

What it is not: an Ethereum-only deployment. Settling integrity proofs through block confirmation alone inherits block latency, seconds not microseconds, which is unfit for real-time payment and agent settlement. TTTPS runs at fabric speed and treats the chain as an optional anchor, not the critical path.

3 · What you implement

Three steps, dropped into the existing flow, no chain change, no reissuance:

1 · Bind. At ingestion, each event is sealed with a Proof of Time token, its timestamp and position in the order, signed. One call at the point of execution.
2 · Reject. A backdated, replayed, or reordered event is refused at the gate, before it is written. Tamper-rejecting, not tamper-detecting.
3 · Verify. Any counterparty or regulator replays the trail and checks each proof with the published public key: operator-independent audit evidence, no access to your infrastructure required.

Deployment

Open-source reference implementation. IETF draft in active submission.

npm install openttt

GitHub: github.com/helm-protocol/openttt
IETF Draft: datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-helmprotocol-tttps/
Production API: info@kenosian.com

Target Deployment: Equinix Fabric Tenants

Target accounts on Equinix Fabric, illustrative, pre-engagement (LOI stage). Revenue figures are estimated potential ARR, not contracted.

Tier 1: Institutional  ·  €12,000/mo

Target Client (Equinix Fabric tenant) Equinix IBX Regulation Value (projected)
Goldman SachsLD4, NY4MiFIR Art.22c + DORA + EU AI Act€144K/yr (projected)
JPMorgan ChaseLD4, NY4, TY3MiFIR Art.22c + DORA + EU AI Act€144K/yr (projected)
Morgan StanleyLD4, NY4MiFIR Art.22c + DORA€144K/yr (projected)
Deutsche BankFR5, LD4EU AI Act GPAI + DORA€144K/yr (projected)
BNP ParibasFR5, LD4EU AI Act + MiFIR Art.22c + DORA€144K/yr (projected)
HSBCLD4, HK1MiFIR Art.22c + DORA + MAS TRM€144K/yr (projected)
MUFG / NomuraTY3, TY5FSA + MiFIR Art.22c€43K/yr (projected)

Tier 2: MiFID Pro  ·  €3,600/mo

Target Client (Equinix Fabric tenant) Equinix IBX Regulation Value (projected)
Citadel SecuritiesLD4, NY4, CH1MiFIR Art.22c RTS, pending application date€43K/yr (projected)
OptiverAM3, CH1MiFIR Art.22c€43K/yr (projected)
IMC TradingAM3, NY4MiFIR Art.22c€43K/yr (projected)
Virtu FinancialNY4, LD4MiFIR Art.22c + FINRA CAT€43K/yr (projected)
Flow TradersAM3, LD4MiFIR Art.22c€43K/yr (projected)
GroqSV1EU AI Act GPAI (Equinix Fabric)€43K/yr (projected)
Lambda LabsSV1EU AI Act GPAI€43K/yr (projected)
CoreWeaveSV1, NY2EU AI Act GPAI€43K/yr (projected)

Target PoPs: LD4 · FR5 · AM3 · NY4 · NY2 · CH1 · SK1 · HK1 · TY3 · TY5 · SV1, leveraging Equinix Fabric's global footprint.

Pricing

Fixed monthly subscription: up to 50M events/month (fair-use). All tiers include Byzantine detection, multi-source Roughtime validation, and audit log retention.

TierPriceIncludes
Compliance €300/month Up to 50M events/month (fair-use) · Byzantine detection · 90-day audit log · Prometheus · JSON-LD export
MiFID Pro €3,600/month All Compliance features · MiFIR Art.22c RTS · KTSat GEO path (±10 ns, roadmap) · high-availability SLA · dedicated onboarding
Institutional €12,000/month All MiFID Pro features · custom retention · co-location support Contact

Market reference: DigiCert timestamp authority $0.10–0.50/token. TTTPS: up to 50M events/month (fair-use cap) with multi-source Roughtime + Byzantine detection included.
Annual contract: 2 months free.  ·  Included in all Hydra product bundles.  ·  Hydra-Audit: standalone or bundled (Contact).

API Access

Production API key required.
Contact info@kenosian.com for access and onboarding.

TierRate LimitAudit Log RetentionAccess
Demo 10 req / min 1 hour No key required
Production Custom 90 days info@kenosian.com

The CoE AI Convention is in force since 2025-11-01. Signed by EU, UK, US et al.; ratified by EU, UK, France, Norway and others. US: signed (not ratified). A TTTPS chain generated at the moment of your AI operation provides cryptographic evidence structured for submission across CoE signatory frameworks.

One cryptographic seal. Designed to support submission across CoE signatory frameworks. GPAI (Art.53) enforcement: August 2, 2026.

2026 Global AI Regulatory Enforcement Timeline: jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction breakdown, Equinix branch mapping, enforcement dates

Trust Mark

TTTPS
Verifiable
WHEN
proposed
“TTTPS-sealed”: the trust mark TTTPS issues (proposed)

TTTPS produces a verifiable, tamper-rejecting record of when an event occurred and in what order, the timing-integrity primitive every Hydra product builds on. If TTTPS is adopted as the standard, a conforming deployment could carry the “TTTPS-sealed” mark, signalling that its records are anchored to verifiable time rather than to a self-asserted clock.

Proposed mark for explanation only. Any “sealed” status is conditional (“could / if adopted”) and would operate under the Kenosian root of trust, not a present-day certification program.